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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
who, in good faith, incur obligations or advance money in reliance
upon the apparent ownership of merchandise entrusted to a factor
for the purpose of sale.8 This was unknown to the common law.9
Under the latter the factor came within the doctrine of the law of
property that no one can give away what he does not own. 10 Some-
times the situation of third parties was alleviated by the doctrine of
estoppel, but in order to give rise to an estoppel, it is essential that
the party estopped shall have made a representation and that someone
shall have acted on the faith of this representation in such a way that
the innocent party cannot withdraw from the transaction without
damage." Thus trade was hampered to no small degree.' 2
Under the Factors' Act the burden of precaution is placed upon
the principal who entrusts his goods to another. 13 At the same time
the rule is not one-sided; the Act applies only where the relation of
the principal and agent exists between the owner and the one having
the merchandise or documentary evidence of title thereof in his pos-
session with actual authority to sell or pledge the merchandise.14
Thus a mere bailee without authority to sell or pledge does not come
within the purview of the statute.15 In a case such as the above it
would seem that the only way to prove authority to sell or to pledge
is by oral evidence. The admissibility of oral evidence is justified
upon the ground that the defendant asserts no right under the written
contract, but that his defense is built upon the rights given an inno-
cent pledgee by the Factors' Act.16 The Factors' Act by statute
makes valid a contract which without such Act would have been in-
valid, because the agent in such cases as the one above had breached
the authority conferred upon him by the principal.' 7
I.T.
USURY-CONDITIONAL SALES AGREEMENT-EXTENSION AGREE-
MENT.-Plaintiff sues in equity to have certain transactions with the
defendant involving conditional sales agreements declared usurious
and void. On November 6, 1935, plaintiff and defendant entered into
8 Freudenheim v. Gutter, 201 N. Y. 94, 94 N. E. 640 (1911).
9 Smith v. Clews, 114 N. Y. 190, 21 N. E. 640 (1911).
10 WILLISTiON, SALES (2d ed.) § 311.
11 Id. § 312.
127 HoLDsWORT, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed.) 510.
'3 Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 N. Y. 521 (1862).
'4 N. Y. Security & Trust Co. v. Lippman, 157 N. Y. 551, 52 N. E. 595(1899).
15 Schwab v. Oatman (rev'd on other grounds) 198 N. Y. 545, 92 N. E.
1101.
16 See note 4, mipra.
'1 See note 3, supra.
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a conditional sales agreement which provided for the payment of
$2,463 for certain beauty parlor equipment and the installation there-
of by the defendant seller. $543 of this amount was a down payment
and $1,920 was to be paid in thirty-two deferred monthly payments
of sixty dollars each, for which the plaintiff made and delivered to
the defendant thirty-two promissory notes. This sum of $2,463 con-
sisted of: $2,150, price of goods sold; $43, sales tax; and $270, fi-
nance charge. On March 1, 1937, the plaintiff and the defendant
entered into a second agreement which stated $1,350.95 still due on
the prior conditional sales agreement and added $208.95 finance
charge, totaling $1,514.90. The old notes were then surrendered to
the plaintiff, who issued new notes therefor based on this newly com-
puted sum of $1,514.90. Held, the first agreement was valid and not
usurious, since the transactions were a sale of merchandise on credit
and involved installment payments for the performance of work and
the difference between cash and credit prices. The second agreement
was void and usurious as an agreement of forbearance extending the
time of payment of a loan or debt in consideration of the payment of
more than the principal due and legal rate of interest. Bonnetti v.
United Beauty Supply, Inc., et al., 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 463 (Spec.
Term, Bronx Co., 1941).
While at common law usury was not illegal, by statute in New
York it is provided that the rate of interest to be charged upon a loan
or forbearance of money, goods or things in action shall not exceed
six per cent.' This shall not be done directly or indirectly. 2 These
usury statutes, however, have been held not to apply to a bona fide
sale of merchandise on time3 Sales on credit, which charge prices
in excess of six per cent over the cash price of the article sold are
not usurious per se.4 However, in the case of Universal Credit Co.
V. Cora Lowell ' the court decided that a carrying charge added to
' N. Y. GENmu. Busmn-ss LAW § 370: "The rate of interest upon a loan
or forbearance of money, goods, or things in action, except as otherwise
provided by law, shall be six dollars on one hundred dollars, for one year, and
at that rate, for a greater or lesser sum, or for a-ionger or shorter time."2 N. Y. GENERAL BusiNESs LAW § 371: "No person or corporation shall,
directly or indirectly, take or receive in money, goods or things in action, or in
any other way, any greater sum or greater value, for the loan or forbearance
of any money, goods or things in action, than is above prescribed."
a Lamula v. Morris Plan Industrial Bank of New York, 173 Misc. 874,
19 N. Y. S. (2d) 357 (1940); Failing v. National Bond and Investment Corp.,
12 N. Y. S. (2d) 260 (1938), reVg, 168 Misc. 617, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 67 (1938),
aff'd, 258 App. Div. 778, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 1011 (4th Dep't 1939).
4 Levine v. Nolan Motors, 169 Misc. 1025, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 311 (1938);
Florida Land Holding Corp. v. Burke, 135 Misc. 341, 238 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1929),
aff'd, 229 App. Div. 853, 243 N. Y. Supp. 799 (1st Dep't 1930) (contract for
the payment of money is not usurious because it provides that credit price
exceeds cash price by a greater per cent than provided by the Statute); McAnsh
v. Blauner, 222 App. Div. 381, 226 N. Y. Supp. 379 (1st Dep't 1928), aff'd, 248
N. Y. 537, 162 N. E. 515 (1928).
5 Universal Credit Co. v. Cora Lowell, 166 Misc. 15, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 743
(1938). Herein, the plaintiff brought an action to replevin an automobile sold
19421]
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the price of an automobile sold under a conditional sales agreement
was a usurious rate of interest, and stated that "the usury statute
applies to the forbearance of a debt created out of the sale of either
realty or personalty". In the case of Archer Motor Co., Inc. v.
Relin 6 a similar transaction was held to be valid and not to constitute
usury since the additional finance charge was not to be paid "for the
loan or forbearance of any money". This latter case is clearly in line
with the majority of opinions in this state and with the instant case.
While at first glance the former case seems entirely inconsistent with
the latter and the instant cases, it is not as irreconcilable as it ap-
pears. In the former action the court scrutinized the entire trans-
action, compared the carrying charge with the cash price and came
to the conclusion that the real facts disclosed usury. It is true the
court added to this finding that the usury statutes apply to sales of
merchandise on credit. However, this was not essential to the de-
cision, for the form of the transaction is never controlling in deter-
mining whether it is usurious, since transactions in the form of sales
may be in fact loans and usurious. 7 Hence, if a pretended sale of
goods is made the underlying scheme for a loan of money upon usury,
the courts will be vigilant to judge the transaction by its real char-
acter rather than by the form the parties seek to give it.8 Therefore,
although the principle stated in the Universal Credit Co. case is
clearly contra to the principle that a sale of merchandise on credit at
a rate greater than six per cent over the cash price is not usury, the
decision may be sustained today on the other grounds stated.
An agreement of forbearance extending the time of payment of
a loan or debt in consideration of the payment of more than the prin-
cipal due plus six per cent, is usurious.9 The Court of Appeals, how-
ever, has affirmed a decision which stated that the charging and ac-
cepting more than six per cent for extending payment due under a
conditional sales contract did not constitute usury.10 In the instant
under a conditional contract of sale. The cash selling price was $792 and a
carrying charge of $130.27 was added. Held, court will scrutinize the transac-
tion and discover the real facts and actual intent and, herein, the "differential"
was the charge of an illegal rate of interesf of 241/2 per cent
6 Archer Motor Co., Inc. v. Relin, 255 App. Div. 333, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 469
(4th Dep't 1938). The owner of an automobile agreed to sell for $125 in cash,
but before the sale was completed, a conditional sales agreement whereby $10
was added to the purchase price, over and above six per cent interest was
entered into by the parties. Held, not a usurious transaction.
7 In re Bechtold's Estate, 159 Misc. 725, 289 N. Y. Supp. 838 (1936);
Wilkie v. Roosevelt, 3 Johns. Cas. 206, 2 Am. Dec. 149 (1802).
8 Archer Motor Co., Inc. v. Relin, 255 App. Div. 333, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 469
(4th Dep't 1938); Hull v. Eagle Insurance Co. of London, England, 151 App.
Div. 815, 136 N. Y. Supp. 724 (lst Dep't 1912), affd, 211 N. Y. 507, 105 N. E.
1085 (1914) ; Quackenbush v. Sayer, 62 N. Y. 344 (1875).
La Monte v. Handy, 250 App. Div. 657, 296 N. Y. Supp. 135 (3d Dep't
1937); Malmud v. Blackman, 232 App. Div. 765, 248 N. Y. Supp. 879 (2d
Dep't 1931) ; Church v. Maloy, 70 N. Y. 63 (1877) ; Real Estate Trust Co. v.
Keech, 69 N. Y. 248 (1877) ; Lovett v. Diamond, 4 Edw. 22 (N. Y. 1839).
'0 P. J. Tierney Sons, Inc. v. Bajowski, 258 N. Y. 563, 180 N. E. 333
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case this decision was not followed, but the general rule above ex-
pressed was dearly adopted.'1 Although the subsequent forbearance
agreement fell as usurious, this did not affect the first valid agreement.
It has long been held that an obligation, valid when created, is not
rendered usurious by a latter agreement calling for an illegal rate of
interest, but the latter agreement alone is void.12 Except for the few
inconsistencies above stated '3 the law as expressed in the instant case
is unchallenged.
S.C.
WoRiK]EN's COmPENSATION-DEDUCTION OF ATTORNEY's FEES
IN COMPUTING EmPLoYER'S LIEN OR DEFICIENCY AwARD--SUBRo-
GATION.-Claimant's husband, an employee of the City of New York,
died February 2, 1938 as the result of injuries sustained in the course
of his employment, which were caused by the negligence of a third
person. On March 21, 1938, pursuant to the provisions of Section
29 of the Workmen's Compensation Law, claimant served a notice
that an action had been commenced against the third person and that
she made claim for all benefits due her under the Act. On March
22, 1938, an award of compensation was filed with the Department
of Labor giving claimant $10.39 per week, and the City promptly
gave notice that the first payment of compensation had been made.
Thereafter, the action against the third person was settled for $14,000
with the employer's written consent. The widow's share in the re-
covery (after allowing for children) was $3,551.70 after deducting
disbursements and attorney's fees, but was $4,368.37 without deduc-
tion of such fees. The employer claimed it was liable only for the
deficiency between the amount of the recovery and the compensation
provided or estimated, and that attorney's fees should not be deducted
in computing the amount of the recovery "actually collected". Held,
Workmen's Compensation Law § 29, subdivisions 1 and 4, must be
read together, and when so read, provide that where a claimant has
recovered from a third person the employer is liable to pay any defi-
ciency between the compensation provided, or estimated, and the
claimant's recovery less disbursements and attorney's fees. Curtin v.
City of New York, 287 N. Y. 338, 39 N. E. (2d) 903 (1942).
A person whose employment falls within the scope of the Work-
men's Compensation Act may not sue his employer at common law
(1932), affg, 233 App. Div. 766, 250 N. Y. Supp. 189 (2d Dep't 1931); cf.
London v. Toney, 263 N. Y. 439, 446, 189 N. E. 485, 4 (1934), "Interest and
forbearance do relate to a money debt originating otherwise than by a loan."
1 See note 9, supra.
12 Hinman v. Brundage, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 363 (Sup. Ct Del. Co. 1939);
La Monte v. Handy, 250 App. Div. 657, 296 N. Y. Supp. 135 (3d Dep't 1937).
13 See notes 5 and 9, supra.
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